The "globalization" of commerce provides ever-growing opportu nities for producers, employers, and service providers to shop the globe for more amenable jurisdictions. While they enjoy a "race to the top," an international "race to the bottom," spawned by decreas ing relocation costs, threatens to compromise the achievements of the welfare state and lower standards of consumer protection. National governments, weakened by competition that entails leaner budgets, find it increasingly difficult to cooperate in the appropriation of crucial shared natural resources, seriously endangering these assets while damaging the environment. Not only does the growing global compe tition create both efficiency losses and social-welfare problems, it also challenges principles of democracy and self-determination. As compe tition constrains nations' available choices, individuals have fewer op portunities to play a meaningful role in shaping their lives through the national collective decisionmaking process.
Largely pessimistic analyses of these collective action challenges have been dominated by the Westphalian paradigm-a model of in ternational relations that views global conflicts solely in terms of the 200-some sovereign states that constitute the global arena. The para digm operates on the still-prevailing premise that nation-states are unitary actors engaging in international competition.1 Even those writers who are themselves aware of the diverse domestic forces that actually shape national policies stop short of identifying the deficien cies -both descriptive and normative -of the Westphalian para digm.2 This Article argues that the Westphalian paradigm is inadequate: by focusing exclusively on interstate relations, it obfuscates the crucial role played by competing domestic interest groups in the international arena. This Article advocates a different paradigm -the transna tional conflict paradigm -that better explains various collective ac tion failures and points the way toward mechanisms that might correct these problems. At its core lies the observation that states are not monolithic entities; and that many of the pervasive conflicts of interest are in fact more internal than external, stemming from the heteroge neity within, rather than among, states. Indeed, the transnational con flict paradigm shows how domestic interest groups often cooperate with similarly situated foreign interest groups in order to impose ex ternalities on rival domestic groups. The better-organized, and hence more politically effective, domestic interest groups -usually produc ers, employers, and service suppliers -cooperate with similar inter ests in diff erent states to exploit less-organized groups such as con sumers, employees, and environmentally vulnerable citizens. Thus, the transnational conflict paradigm attributes many global collective action failures to conflicts among warring domestic groups rather than international competition among states.
The transnational conflict paradigm also exposes how crucial con stitutional and international norms actually perpetuate the power im balance among rival domestic interest groups. Current norms and procedures, both constitutional and international, are inherently slanted in favor of groups with historically stronger domestic political power. Constitutional and administrative legal scholarship has long been alert to the observation that public life consists of "competition among pressure groups for political influence."3 Accordingly, public choice theorists have analyzed domestic norms, procedures, and insti tutions as potential tools for regulating this competition. But at the same time, these scholars paid little attention to the domestic ramifica tions of international law's laissez-faire framework, which continues to provide a convenient exit option for those finding domestic controls too stringent. Producers can evade tight domestic regulations simply by shifting their activities to a different jurisdiction. In addition, inter-1501 (1998) (reaching a pessimistic conclusion due to conflicting national policies that result from the conflicting interests of producers and importers in different states). Other writers continue to impute interests and expectations to states despite awareness of the heterogene ity of domestic politics. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALEJ. INT'LL. l, 20-21 (1999) .
3. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983) . This institutionalized imbalance went unheeded in in ternational legal scholarship, perhaps due to the traditional division between constitutional and international law. A similar departmentalization occurred in political science, with the emergence of international relations as a separate branch of scholarship. See Helen V. Mil ner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Com parative Politics, 52 INT'L ORG. 759, 762-67 (1998) .
national commercial organizations, such as the International Coffee Organization4 and the International Tin Council,5 enable producers and importers to perform a "virtual exit," whereby they obtain immu nity from the jurisdiction of national courts, evade antitrust and other national regulations, and avoid liability in case of insolvency.6 These exit options, facilitated by constitutional and international law and closely guarded by smaller domestic groups, drive the global race to the bottom as well as other collective action failures.
This Article explores the ramifications of the still dominant West phalian paradigm from the perspectives of efficiency, democracy, and equity. It then suggests norms, procedures, and institutions to correct the current intergroup imbalance, and thereby offers better prospects for transnational cooperation and more equitable, sustainable, and democratic management of national and global commons.
Part ' II analyzes the transnational conflict paradigm and examines how sectarian domestic interests shape international negotiations and politics, and consequently influence the development of international law. Part III offers an overview of the systemic outcomes of that sec tarian influence, namely the establishment and entrenchment of con stitutional and international norms, procedures, and institutions to se cure domestic small group influence.
Part IV assesses the transnational consequences of the dominant, and essentially unregu lated, role played by small interest groups in the formation of those norms. It then shows how the resulting legal bias has contributed to global market failures, current trends away from the welfare state, and the demise of effective citizen voice in collective decisionmaking. Part V then develops a theory of transnational institutions that could limit small interest group capture while offering more effective opportuni ties for democratic participation in national and transnational deci sionmaking.
II. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AS THE AGENT OF SMALL INTEREST GROUPS
After describing the domestic interaction among the various actors within the state, this Part applies public choice theory to demonstrate the relative edge smaller domestic interests enjoy over larger groups in shaping the outcome of international negotiations. As a result, spe 4. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65. 5. See infra notes 48-49. 6. For a discussion of the immunity of international organizations (!Os), see infra note 48 and accompanying text. For a more thorough discussion of the inapplicability of antitrust laws and other "long-arm statutes" and the absence of liability of states to IO obligations, see infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. cific treaties, and international law in general, are skewed in favor of such groups.7
A. The Transnational Conflict Paradigm
Political economists long ago demonstrated convincingly that state institutions provide an effective means for certain domestic interest groups to exploit less organized domestic groups in the competitive market for political goods (such as taxes, subsidies, and favorable market regulation).8 In this market, more organized groups, namely those composed of a relatively smaller number of individuals, can out bid larger groups because the former realize both higher per capita benefits from cooperation with fellow group members and lower costs of monitoring and sanctioning free riders.9 Hence, other things being equal, smaller groups, such as producers and employers, will obtain collective goods more efficiently than larger groups of consumers or employees, thereby securing a disproportionate share of the aggregate social welfare while externalizing part of their production costs onto the larger groups.10
Small groups' greater organizational capabilities also provide them a competitive edge in obtaining and assessing information on poli cies.11 More effective monitoring of the government prompts politi cians and bureaucrats to bias policy in favor of those who can appreci ate their efforts. The larger body of ill-informed voters hardly notices 7. In fact, the structure of foreign relations and international law ensure even greater small interest group capture than at the purely domestic level. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) . 9. As a result, the political influence of groups is inversely related to their size. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-36 (1965) . Ethnic, national, ra cial, and indigenous minorities are usually excluded from this definition of small groups. Although numerically inferior relative to the larger community, their organizational costs may be relatively higher than those of the majority. But there may be political circum stances in which they in fact obtain political influence that outweighs their relative size. See Bruce A Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (suggesting that not all minorities are "discrete and insular'').
10. This does not entail that small groups will achieve optimal amounts of a potential collective good. Collective losses still result from the unequal incentive of individuals within that group to contribute to the collective effort (determined by the relative stake each indi vidual has in the collective pie). But it does suggest that "the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good." OLSON, supra note 9, at 35. 11 . For an explanation of information as a collective good, see Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92(4) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809 (1998) ; see also Michael D. Rosenbaum, Domestic Bureaucracies and the International Trade Regime: The Law and Economics of Administrative Law and Administratively Imposed Trade Barriers (Discussion Paper No. 250 1/99, The Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School), available at <http://www .law.harvard.edu/programs /olin_center> (arguing that administrative procedures that lower the costs of access to in formation shift power over policymaking from more-organized to less-organized groups). [Vol. 98:167 their relative loss or attributes it to random factors.12 Thus, the inf or mation rationale suggests that small-group policy bias stems not neces sarily only from more effective lobbying, but also from more efficient monitoring of the policies once adopted.13 It also explains the growing influence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which ad vance the cause of larger groups by promoting, for example, human rights or protection of the environment. The information they gather and disseminate improves the effectiveness of monitoring bodies, such as the legislature, and reduces the incentive to adopt policies that are biased against the larger groups.14 As Olson elaborates in The Rise and Decline of Nations, because smaller groups could organize themselves more quickly within the nascent Westphalian system of sovereign states, they were able to use the states as instruments for obtaining a disproportionate share of re sources for themselves.15 Indeed, the political institutions of the emerging nations reflected just such a skewed power relationship be tween the smaller and larger groups. Constitutions insulated the smaller groups' share from majority vote16 without restricting the op portunities for small groups to influence politicians and bureaucrats.17
Domestic political dynamics (and consequently, transnational po litical dynamics) involve not only large and small groups vying for po litical influence, but also the interests and preoccupations of politi cians, bureaucrats, and judges. Politicians, whose immediate interest is election or reelection, broker public goods in exchange for campaign contributions or other political support (in nondemocratic regimes) or personal financial gains (in nondemocratic regimes). The bureauc- 17. Marx, of course, made a stronger claim -namely that small groups, the bourgeoisie, invented the state system to exploit the masses. For Marxist-oriented historiography of the emergence (and possible demise) of the nation state that corroborates the Olsonian thesis, see generally ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (2d ed. 1992). racy, on the other hand, if properly insulated from the political system, is relatively immune to the immediate influence of interest groups;18 judges even more so. 19 The relative insulation of bureaucrats and judges from political influence provides a useful tool for competing in terest groups. In matters where policy shifts due to fluctuating politi cal influence are undesirable, groups may agree to establish adminis trative agencies comprised of bureaucrats independent from political influence. Thus, for example, by relegating the management of the national monetary system to administrative agencies -the central banks -rival domestic groups have solved a difficult collective action problem.20 Similarly, constitutional guarantees against, for example, the taking of property have also been used to secure deals among do mestic groups.21
Greater political independence from interest group influence does not mean that bureaucrats and judges necessarily pursue what they deem to be the "national interest" of their state. Their decisions may reflect certain biases. Thus, in addition to personal status and a com fortable income, bureaucrats are motivated by an interest in ensuring for themselves (and their institution) greater budgetary discretion, thereby gaining latitude to implement policies as they see fit.22 Judges, on the other hand, hesitate to formulate an independent view of the "national interest," deferring instead to the visions of politicians and bureaucrats. Not only do they refrain from imposing any strings on extraterritorial activity of the government, private citizens, or domes tic firms; they also find myriad ways to rebuff challenges to such activi-18. Of course, bureaucracies in many countries may not be insulated, and hence will tend to reflect the interests of the politicians and interest groups. Political control of the ap pointments process is usually the most effective and pervasive way to ensure a submissive bureaucracy. See Randy Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588 (1989) . But the private market, where many regulators eventually find themselves, is another powerful source of influence. , 1995) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES]. For a discussion of the private benefits (mainly income, prestige, and a peaceful life) and the institutional benefits (larger and more discretionary budgets) that accrue to bureaucrats from participation in international organizations (and which, in tum, account for their proliferation), see Bruno S. Frey, The Public Choice of In ternational Organization, in PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 106-23. (Vol. 98:167 ties despite seemingly clear language in domestic or international laws that prohibits them.23 This hesitation is nowhere more evident than in matters involving the state's international relations. Courts in all ju risdictions have developed an array of doctrines -such as the politi cal question doctrine, justiciability, and act of state -to muffle their role as effective keepers of the rule of law in the international arena.24
This strong judicial deference hints at the strategy small groups have developed to shield themselves against the vagaries of democratic vote.
Whereas no constitution is beyond legislative interpretation and, ultimately, popular amendment to the detriment of small groups,25 international law and the court's deference in the international arena facilitate the exit option, and hence offer the ultimate protection of their interests.26 When larger groups have managed to mobilize and impose restrictions on producers and employers, such as antitrust regulations and higher labor standards, the latter have reacted by shifting their activities to foreign markets and societies.27 When domestic groups attempted to regulate these extraterritorial activities through so-called "long arm statutes," international law provided shelter.28 The next Section shows how the laissez-faire nature of international law continues to enable smaller groups to evade national regulations and exploit global commons. In fact, these smaller groups have had an even greater influence on the development of international than on domestic law, primarily because information-gathering and assessment costs are much higher in the international arena. Since ancient times, international negotiations have always enjoyed relative secrecy reinforced by public and judicial approval of a Machiavellian-Darwinian view of sovereign states struggling for survival in an anarchic and intimidating global environment. Shielded from public scrutiny, small groups (producers, importers, etc.) exercise great influence on the governments' conduct 23. Cf ROGER R. COTIERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 248-49 {1984) ("Judges, however, as state functionaries, cannot neglect considerations of state interests and these may, on occasions, demand that doctrinal niceties be given short shrift in order to meet par ticular governmental emergencies."). REV. 903, 910-11 {1996) {noting that the transformation of the Western nation state into a welfare state accelerated its decline).
See infra
28. International law did so through the creation of international organizations (IOs), which are immune to national regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
of external affairs. The edge small groups enjoy can be traced by following the development of international norms. The following section examines the actual influence these groups have had in the formulation of policies in several areas of law.
B. The Transnational Conflict Paradigm in Practice

1.
Early Cases
Smaller groups have been successful in influencing international negotiations and international law since the very inception of the Westphalian order of sovereign states. In fact, a small but effective group of Dutch merchants who sought to secure access to the high seas were responsible for the birth of modern international law. In 1604, these merchants (who formed the Dutch United East India Company) commissioned a legal brief from a young lawyer," Hugo Grotius -now widely regarded as the founder of international law.29 His opinion, Mare liberum (published as a book in 1609),30 a brilliant defense of the notion of the high seas as a shared resource, trans formed the course of development of international law. 31 The early seventeenth century witnessed several commercial dis putes among merchants from diff erent European countries. Grotius's treatise related to a conflict between Portuguese and Dutch merchants over the right to navigate the high seas leading to the coveted spice markets of the Far East.32 At the same time, Dutch fishing fleets ar-29. On the Grotian legacy in international Jaw, see David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 76-95 (1986) ; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1946) . But see the fierce critique in Giorgio del Vecchio, Grotius and the Foundation of International Law, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 260 (1962) . 30. The Dutch company ordered publication of an anonymous version in connection with negotiations between the Netherlands and Spain, and possibly for reasons related to domestic political conflict in the Netherlands. See C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the Interna tional Politics of the Seventeenth Century, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95, 109 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990) . For the background of the treatise, see C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and International Law: An Introduction to Some Themes in the Field of Grotian Studies, in GROTIUS READER 3, 9-10 (L.E. 31. Grotius envisioned a world order based on sovereign states subject to nothing but their free \viii. State consent, rather than God's commands or Papal grants, was therefore the basis of international obligations. Accordingly, Grotius's reasoning refrained from al luding to religious text and instead emphasized utilitarian arguments, such as economic effi ciency: "[W]hen it can be done without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one per son share with another things which are useful to the recipient, and no Joss to the giver?" HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 38 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., James Brown Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1633).
32.
See VREELAND, supra note 30, at 51-52.
gued with their English competitors over the right to fish in the waters of the North Sea, or what King James I called the "British Seas."33 When English merchants grew interested in tapping the profitable Far East markets, only to be rebuffed by Dutch competitors who had managed to secure exclusive contracts with the foreign rulers, inter governmental talks began in London. 34 The merchants arguably could have resolved these commercial disputes themselves through transna--tional negotiations and contracts rather than interstate agreements.35 But some influential competitors preferred to alter the game by mobi lizing the support of their state and the strength of its army in their ef forts to eliminate competition and ensure private capture. In other words, these merchants sought to externalize the costs of creating a trade monopoly on the state apparatus, whose military resources were enlisted to secure the desired goal.36 This was a cozy deal for the rul ing elites: in addition to added prestige, these dignitaries could benefit from their merchants' increased revenues.
In the book pleased King Charles so much that he ordered it to be placed among the public records of the courts.38 Alberico Gentili, an Italian born Oxford professor, who represented Spanish interests in the Eng lish Court of Admiralty, took a middle course that reflected his clients' objectives.39 Thus, interest groups formed general arguments to ad vance their sectarian interests. International law quickly became a tool for externalizing small-group costs upon the larger segments of society.
Contemporary Conflicts
The early seventeenth-century commercial disputes show how quickly the dominant domestic interest groups adjusted to, and learned to exploit, the emerging Westphalian order of sovereign states. For this purpose, they used their strong influence on their states' external relations not only to shape the outcomes of specific treaty negotiations; but more generally, they influenced the develop ment of both domestic and international law to create and maintain a laissez-faire international legal environment. Such an environment fa cilitates competition among states which small groups, whose reloca tion costs are relatively low, continue to exploit.40
At the end of the twentieth century, international law still provides small groups the same exit options that existed in earlier times. De spite the growing effectiveness of labor conditions and human rights norms, producers can still shop for jurisdictions that provide them with virtually unprotected workforces. Even though early awareness of the need to cooperate in promoting labor standards led to the establish ment of the International Labour Organisation in 1919, no machinery yet exists to monitor countries and effectively ensure compliance.41 Developments in human rights law have emphasized civil and political rights rather than economic and social rights, thereby constraining governments while leaving multinational employers relatively un scathed. 42 The other exit option -transactions through state-brokered agreements subject to international law -provides small domestic groups with significant benefits. While private law contracts are often costly to negotiate and enforce because of monitoring and compliance problems, reliance on the state machinery for negotiation and moni toring may lower transaction costs, or at least externalize them.
Moreover, domestic norms that regulate private law contracts, such as antitrust or consumer-protection regulations, impose significant limita tions on certain transactions and hence increase transaction costs dra matically. By signing international treaties, governments can enable producers and other small interests to avoid these cumbersome limita tions by shifting certain transactions onto the international plane.43 In ternational law, which governs these treaties, remains virtually oblivi ous to the adverse effects treaties might have on the interests of nonstate third parties, such as consumers and workers.44 Under the influence of the Westphalian paradigm, there has been little effort to adjust the normative framework of international treaty law, which still reflects early nineteenth-century laissez-faire values.45
Governments provide small interest groups the greatest level of protection, however, through the establishment of international or ganizations (!Os) as the locus of particular economic activities.46 !Os have an independent legal personality under international law.47 They enjoy immunity from suits in national courts and are not subject to any 43. Governments accomplish this shift through the establishment of IOs. For a more thorough treatment of the role of IOs, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. For a specific discussion of the International Coffee Organization, see infra notes 63·65 and ac companying text. 46. An international organization is defined as an organization created by two or more states, usually by a treaty; which has one or more organs that do not depend on the will of one state only; and which is subject to international, rather than to a particular national, law national rules prohibiting antitrust or protecting creditors against in solvency.48 More importantly (from the participating states' perspec tive), international law works together with national statutes and judi cial doctrine to further secure state interests at the expense of individuals who interact with !Os. These norms shield state parties to such organizations from direct or vicarious liability for acts of the insti tutions.49 Thus, it remains questionable whether such organizations are subject to the same duties states owe for the protection of human rights.50 In short, international law, through its laissez-faire approach to treaties and !Os, continues to provide a convenient legal environ ment to domestic small interest groups seeking to pursue transnational to the state parties to the international organization to determine whether or not they would be responsible for its debts, and their choice should be reflected in the IO's constitutive documents). See generally MOSHE HIRSCH, THE REsPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES (1995) . Until recently, the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility contributed to the presumed lack of responsibility. Draft Article 13 suggested that:
The conduct of an organ of an international organization acting in that capacity shall not be considered as an act of a State under international law by reason only of the fact that such conduct has taken place in the territory of that State or in any other territory under its juris diction.
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in 37 l.L.M. , 445 (1998) . In its 1998 decision, the ILC decided to replace Article 13 and all other ref erences to !Os with a saving clause, which removed the entire question of state responsibility to !Os from the scope of the Draft Articles. Draft Article A now reads: "These draft articles shall not prejudice any question that may arise in regard to the responsibility under interna tional law of an international organization or of any State for the conduct of an international organization." See Bruno Simma, The Work of the International Law Commission at Its Fif tieth Session (1998), 67 NORDICJ. INT'LLAW 431, 456 (1998 commercial transactions sheltered from the ever-growing national regulation.
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The domestic bureaucracy and political leadership are the firms' willin g partners. Similar to their seventeenth-century predecessors, they eagerly engage in such transactions. Together with the emerging transnational bureaucracy, they profit from greater discretion in the reallocation of the surplus resources such agreements generate, in ad dition to the status and perks these missions provide.51 The public re mains largely unaware of the implications of such transactions; thus, politicians find it politically advantageous to tolerate them.
Domestic influences are particularly noticeable in environmental disputes.
From the first international litigation related to trans boundary environmental damage -sulfur dioxide emissions from a Canadian smelting company at Trail in British Columbia52 -to cur rent debates over prevention of global warming and the protection of the ozone layer, sectarian domestic interests hold sway in international negotiations and influence the development (or lack thereof) of inter national law. Thus, for example, the governments of the upper riparian states tolerated the continuous pollution of the Rhine River throughout the 1970s and 1980s out of deference to those industries that treated the river as their private backyard dumping area.53 These governments, yielding to the interests of the domestic industries and their workforce, colluded to stall effective plans to reclaim and protect the river by their sustained support for a largely ineffective interna tional protection system.54 Similarly, Finland and Sweden, whose co-51. See Frey, supra note 22, at 106-23. 52. The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 RI.A. A. 1905 (1938) . , 1997) . The fact that these cases of pollution had to be brought to court, and by Dutch NGOs, suggests the politi cal constraints involved.
54.
The polluting industries along the Rhine, from Basel, Switzerland, to the heavily operation is usually cause for envy and emulation,55 failed to agree on jointly reducing pollution from pulp mills due to the successful resis tance to regulation initiatives mounted by their respective pulp indus tries.56
Domestic interest groups also shaped the United States position in international negotiations. U.S. leadership in global efforts to curb production of CFC emissions to protect the ozone layer throughout the 1980s and early 1990s was motivated primarily by the five Ameri can CFC producers -producers responsible for thirty percent of the world production, but whose CFC sales did not account for a signifi cant part of their revenue. Once these firms developed substitutes for most CFC uses, they stood to gain from a global CFC ban.57 In con trast, the contemporaneous U.S. failure to join the Convention on Biological Diversity was a function of the adverse economic conse quences it entailed for private American companies.58 Negotiations over a Biosafety Protocol under the Biological Diversity Convention collapsed in February 1999. 59 The protocol, which would have re stricted trade in genetically modified agricultural products, was blocked by a coalition of six states whose industries had strong inter ests in such trade.60 Domestic interest groups shape international trade law and nego tiations. They have driven governments into both trade wars and vioindustrialized Ruhr in Germany, opposed stringent controls that would increase production costs. Their workers shared this interest, fearing for their jobs. These groups shaped their governments' positions in negotiating the Rhine treaty regime. See Schwabach, supra note 53, at 469-70. Following the 1986 major spill of toxic chemicals into the Rhine from the San doz warehouse in Basel, the West German opposition party, the Social Democrats, justified its decision to remain silent by the fear of industry relocation: "We can't pull out of the in dustrial society . . . . We don't want to." Russel Watson et al., The Blot on the Rhine, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at lations of trade agreements.61 Trade agreements, informal under standings, and even elaborate institutional regimes help producers from different countries establish and maintain cartels to the detri ment of consumers.62 Other treaties reflect complex give and take be tween producers and bureaucrats. Robert Bates' recent study of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) is an in-depth exploration of a contemporary example of an international market failure that the prevailing Westphalian paradigm is incapable of addressing.63 The ICO was a cartel of coffee-producing states, controlled by the two leading producers, Brazil and Colombia. During the almost three decades of its operation, from the early 1960s to late 1989, the ICO set quotas for participating states, thereby restraining competition and raising the price of coffee. The United States supported the ICO. In fact, the support of the United States, responsible for over fifty per cent of the world's imports of coffee, was integral to the ICO's en forcement because the monitoring and policing of quotas was left to the consuming states' customs offices. In other words, for almost three decades the U.S. government spent public resources to police a scheme that actually imposed a significant but hidden tax on Ameri can coffee consumers and encroached on certain U.S. businesses. Po litical rather than economic reasons motivated this behavior, and these actions cannot be understood without piercing the veil of national sovereignty. The U.S. position was the result of a comfortable deal among a small domestic interest group (the large coffee roasting firms), legislators, and bureaucrats. The higher price for raw materials gave the larger roasters an economic advantage over the smaller ones.
In exchange for long-term contracts with deferred rebates, these large 61. Ongoing trade disputes between the United States and the European Union over E.U. restrictions on the importation of genetically modified food, hormone-treated beef, and bananas from Central America, as well as U.S. retaliatory measures in the form of 100% tariffs on certain E.U. exports to the U.S., reflect competition, rather than collusion, among rival domestic interests. But they also reflect the direct influence these domestic groups have on their respective governments' positions. This influence has prompted the E.U. to disregard the rulings of the World Trade Organization, which had found the E.U. in breach of trade agreements in both the banana and beef hormone disputes. roasters lobbied and testified in Congress for its endorsement of the !CO regime.64 A complacent Congress benefited the executive bu reaucracy, whose dominant goal was to prevent domestic challenges to the U.S.-backed Latin American regimes, a threat they called "Cas troism."65 The ICO deal provided an opportunity to shift unnoticed funds from the U.S. economy to Latin America, making some influen tial producers happy.
A final example in support of the transnational conflict paradigm is the treatment of global tax competition by the Organization for Eco nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In view of "the dis torting effects of harmful tax competition," the OECD created a committee in 1996 to report on the situation and recommend possible measures to address it.66 Two years later, the OECD Council ap proved the committee's report and adopted its modest and controver sial recommendations.67 The report makes clear that pervasive tax competition is not only economically inefficient, but also inequitable as it shifts the tax burden from mobile capital to less mobile laborthat is, from the smaller groups to the larger ones.68 The report spe cifically identifies domestic business interests as responsible for the ever-expanding competition. The committee, in a rather diplomatic tone, hints at the political complexity of the issue: from 1985 to 1994, foreign direct investment from G7 countries in low tax jurisdictions increased more than five-fold, well above the growth rate of total out bound foreign direct investments.69 In other words, although the heads of the G7 claim to be troubled by what they see as "harmful tax competition ... carrying risks of distorting trade and investment [that] could lead to the erosion of national tax bases,"70 they have not com mitted to taking effective action that would adversely affect their re spective domestic actors. about the "partial and unbalanced approach" of the report and rec ommendations, it remains to be seen whether the rest of the OECD countries will implement the recommendations.72
III. THE TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT PARADIGM AND THE LAW:
SUSTAINING NORMS, PROCEDURES, AND INSTITUTIONS Smaller domestic interest groups have not only used their relative edge over other domestic groups to secure specific gains and a com fortable international legal environment; they have also invested in es tablishing a legal framework to ensure their continuing control over international negotiations and secure the durability of negotiated trea ties while allowing low-cost, momentary evasions of treaty obligations. This Part will delineate the relevant norms, procedures, and institu tions that make up this framework.
A. Treaty Negotiation and Ratification
Smaller domestic interest groups enj oy a great deal of control over the treaty negotiation process and outcome, and therefore risk little in shifting these transactions from the private to the international sphere. As suggested by Robert Putnam, the structure of international nego tiations is a two-level game simultaneously played by government rep resentatives at the international level with the representatives of the foreign governments and at the domestic level with representatives of domestic interest groups.73 The smaller domestic interest groups, be cause of their particularly strong influence in the negotiation and rati fication processes, are poised to dominate the game at the domestic level. They will capture the executive, or instead stall, water down, or block negotiations that could encroach on their interests. 74 The do mestic level of the game is composed of two phases: the negotiation phase, followed by the ratification phase. The smaller interest groups have particularly strong influence during the negotiation phase. At that opaque stage, smaller groups are better positioned than other groups to act collectively in monitoring the government's representa- tives and furnishing them with partial data.75 Should they fail to per suade the executive, they can revert to the second line of defensethe ratification phase. International agreements usually require na tional ratification in one form or another,76 and different ratification forms have bearing on negotiators' available options.77 Because of the advantage smaller groups have during the negotiation stage, however, the often times more transparent and accessible ratification process is more likely to serve as a check on their gains at the first phase rather than as a shield; but the check is not very effective. During the ratifi cation phase, smaller groups still enjoy a relative edge over larger groups because they can take advantage of the information collected during the negotiation phase, over which they have a virtual monop oly.
The particular vulnerability of the process of treaty negotiation and ratification to interest group influence is made clearer when com pared to garden-variety, domestic legislation. In contrast to the rela tively transparent and accessible legislative process, international ne gotiations are less susceptible to serious domestic scrutiny and effective democratic deliberation. Moreover, unlike legislative pro posals, which the legislature controls from the initial introduction of bills through the discussion of amendments to the final product, the treaty to be ratified is a completed transaction essentially immune from subsequent unilateral alterations.78 The sequential process of treaty ratification allows the government a free hand in setting the agenda, formulating the policies, and choosing among alternatives.79 76. This is true not only in democratic countries in which treaties must be approved by domestic ratification procedure. Nondemocratic regimes must also secure informal ratifica tion by the elites from which they draw support. See Peter B. Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY, supra note 73, at 397, 415-16 (comparing domestic influence on international positions in demo cratic and nondemocratic regimes); cf. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commit ment in International Relations, 50 INT'L ORO. 108 (1996) (arguing that democracies can better maintain international commitments than nondemocracies can.). 77. Thus, the different ratification procedures in the United States and Britain, and the different legal status of treaties within the respective domestic legal systems can explain their different attitudes toward the adoption of international environmental standards. Cf. Raustiala, supra note 58 (comparing the two countries' attitudes in negotiating international biodiversity standards).
78. For an analysis of the political advantages presidents have over the legislature through the exclusive power to initiate, to make take-it-or-leave-it proposals, and to control information, see MATIHEW s. SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES 139-40 (1992) .
79. There are profound advantages to the party who can decide how to sequence the voting process when there are more than two options open to the voters (and when there are more than two voters). As was formally demonstrated in KENNETH J. ARR OW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALVES (1951), the agenda-setter can virtually dictate the final vote simply by deciding the order of votes.
The ex post "take it or leave it" option presented to the ratifying body erects a high hurdle for those who wish to oppose or amend the inter national transaction.80
In many states the ratification process does not require legislative approval and hence permits even fewer opportunities to scrutinize the treaty.81 In Scandinavia, and in those states following the British tradi tion, the government, rather than the legislature, ratifies the treaty and thereby commits the state to international obligations.82 In theory, such ratification does not carry any domestic implications, because ratification cannot change national law. But in fact, unless there is a statute that specifically conflicts with the treaty obligations, the gov ernment is not deterred from implementing these obligations domesti cally through regulations or other acts. Under the Charming Betsy doctrine,83 the onus is on the legislature to pass a statute that would explicitly invalidate the treaty's internal effect. The legislature may hesitate to do so, because such enactment could amount to a breach of the state's international obligations.
In the United States, the interplay between Congress and the Ex ecutive in the treaty ratification process is more complicated. On the one hand, the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Senate for "advice and consent" to treaties endows a minority of 34 senators with veto power,84 thereby enabling interest groups to con centrate their efforts on fewer legislators.85 Executive agreements 80. Reservations, understandings, and declarations and interpretations, attached to trea ties at the time of ratification or made thereafter, could alter somewhat the contours of the agreement without breaching it. Note, however, that such pronouncements may be limited by the treaty or by general international law, which proscribes reservations that are "incom patible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 19(c). compromise this strategy, however, by allowing a presidential bypass of the Senate in the conclusion of international obligations.86 Small groups need therefore invest in influencing the executive. In recent years, the United States has developed a so-called "fast track" proce dure with respect to trade agreements in which the President agrees to involve Congress in the negotiation phase in return for a bicameral congressional commitment to vote the agreement up or down without amendment.87 Congress's involvement at the negotiation phase limits the discretion of government negotiators at the international bargain ing process and provides more voice to groups that are less influential \v ith the Executive, although the President continues to control the agenda.
See Stefan
Domestic courts have embraced the pervasive lack of significant legislative supervision of international negotiations. In the celebrated case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the United States Supreme Court affirmed that
[i]n this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotia tion the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. 88
The logic of this argument holds as long as the distinction between domestic and international affairs remains sharp. But when interna- 88. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) . The Court used Congress's relative lack of information as an argument against its involvement in decisionmaking: [ The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries , and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other offi cials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.
Id. at 320. [Vol. 98:167 tional negotiations impose significant burdens on domestic policies and on individuals, executive power must be limited.
For the same reasons, courts have been reluctant to assert their own powers to review ratified treaties. As a result, treaties enj oy greater immunity from judicial review than statutes. In some coun tries, the constitution accords treaties a higher status than statutes, sometimes even higher than the constitution itself, thereby immuniz ing treaties from judicial scrutiny.89 In those jurisdictions where treaty ratification is deemed a governmental (formerly a royal) prerogative, treaties are insulated from judicial review, somewhat paradoxically, because they have no direct effect in the domestic legal system and hence no effect on individual rights.90 In other states, national courts are, in theory, competent to review the constitutionality of treaties (or of statutes implementing treaties), but only the constitutional courts of Italy, Germany, and the United States have asserted such authority, and then only in rare and exceptional cases. 91 The judicial hesitation to constitutionally scrutinize treaties fits well with the general attitude of national courts to defer to the discre tion of the executive in conducting the country's foreign affairs.92 Ju-89. See, e.g., J.D. de la Rochere, France, in EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 42 (discussing article 55 of the French constitution); Henry G. Schermers, Netherlands, in EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 109, 111 (discussing article 120 of the Dutch consti tution).
90. This applies to Britain and other Commonwealth countries, as well as to the Scandi navian countries. See Templeman, supra note 82, at 461; sources cited supra note 82. 92. See Byal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International dicial interference with treaty obligations is deemed an intervention in international affairs, regardless of the domestic implications. The ba sic attitude has been that in international affairs, "[o]ur State cannot speak with two voices on such a matter, the judiciary saying one thing, the executive another,"93 and the executive's voice is preferred because of an inherent "advantage of the diplomatic approach to the resolu tion of difficulties between two sovereign nations, as opposed to the unilateral action by the courts of one nation."94 Hence, only the ex ecutive's voice will be heard. Therefore, not only do courts abstain from reviewing international treaties for compatibility with domestic prescriptions, but when interpreting them they also defer to the execu tive's interpretation.95 Furthermore, a variety of judicially developed "avoidance doctrines" permit the courts to dodge petitions to review treaties against domestic norms, or to review domestic policies against international norms.96 Such extreme deference to the executive is deeply troubling as it enables a sizable amount of executive activity, having major ramifications on domestic interests, to remain com pletely beyond judicial reach and effective public scrutiny. As the next two sections will show, the same deferential attitude persists be yond the ratification stage, when attempts are made to terminate uni laterally a treaty or to renege temporarily on it. This ensures the ex ecutive branch virtually unfettered discretion in deciding whether to comply with treaty obligations.
B. Ensuring Treaty Durability
Domestic and international norms that insulate treaty obligations from postratification domestic challenges by larger political groups further enhance the stronger domestic effect of treaties vis-a-vis stat-Norms: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159 (1993) . This comparative survey proves that the phenomenon is common to all national courts, and therefore cannot be explained by parochial theories. But cf. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFI'A Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (explaining judicial ac ceptance of the constitutionality of "executive agreements" as reflecting a "constitutional moment" that occurred during the 1944 elections); Paul, supra note 86 (explaining that and other propresidential policies as influenced by the Cold War rhetoric used by the administra tion). 96. Id. at 169-73. These doctrines range from the more general ones, such as standing, justiciability, and the political question doctrine, to specific doctrines that reduce the bite of international norms (deference to the executive's interpretation of treaty provisions, failure to recognize the standing of individuals to seek redress for the violation of international ob ligations) and protect local and foreign governments from judicial proceedings (through sov ereign immunity or "act-of-state" doctrines). [Vol. 98:167 utes. Once ratified, there is neither an opportunity to revoke a treaty through judicial review, nor the possibility of terminating it through unilateral state action by, for example, a statute. Unless the ratifying state chooses to violate the treaty and suffer whatever consequences breach entails, it remains bound until the other signatories agree to modify or terminate it.97 Herein lies the domestic smaller groups' chief benefit from treaties: the treaty provides their gains greater pro tection than does a constitutional guarantee. Unlike constitutional guarantees, which are vulnerable to modification through constitu tional amendments, no subsequent domestic maj ority can unilaterally change the state's international obligations. Future governments will therefore continue to be bound by the same obligations.
The Arantzazu
A combination of constitutional and international doctrines grant this immunity to international treaties. International law ensures treaty durability by rendering irrelevant all subsequent domestic po litical developments as factors that might affect a state's international obligations.98 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently dem onstrated the strength of this doctrine in its 1997 judgment concerning a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia. 99 The ICJ determined that the damming of the Danube River, a mamm oth project conceived in the bygone communist era, should go ahead despite the momentous political transformations that had taken place in the two states and the intensive and widespread popular opposition to the project in Hun gary. Neither domestic political changes nor strong popular opposi tion to the project could excuse the unilateral termination of a 1977 treaty.100 The communist legacy, however inefficient or environmen tally dangerous, survived the transformation of both regimes and all unilateral contradictory moves of the two governments.101 Finding the 97. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, arts. 39-40.
98. See id. art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justifica tion for its failure to perform a treaty."). agreement flexible and therefore renegotiable, the ICJ imposed the 1977 treaty on both sides, prescribing them to renegotiate its implementa tion.102 The judgment clearly seeks to insulate international politics from the influence of domestic politics. Even when one side breaches its obli gation to renegotiate in good fa ith, the government of the other side cannot bow to domestic internal public pressure and adopt a unilateral response. Instead, it must exhaust all possible means to persuade its counterpart to return to the negotiating table. 103 The international legal doctrine is buttressed in many countries by constitutional or doctrinal guarantees that insulate treaties from ef forts of domestic groups to force the government to breach treaty ob ligations. Aside from the few states where treaty obligations enj oy su perior status,104 statutes can theoretically supercede treaty obligations; the legislature may pass a conflicting law and thereby exp ose the state to external sanctions. A judicially created rule of statutory interpreta tion accepted in many jurisdictions -that statutes should be inter preted as much as possible in conformity with the state's international obligations -often preempts these efforts, however.105 Although the stated justification is the presumed intent of the legislature, courts have resorted to the rule in spite of rather clear indications from the legislature that it wanted the treaty breached. A case in point is the "sad case of the P.L.O. mission," in which the judge disregarded Con gress's clear intent to breach the Headquarters Agreement between the U.S. and the U.N. by preventing the PLO leader from arriving in New York. 106 The court found the statute vague enough to permit an 102. See id. at paras. 138-140, at 77-78. 103. Tiris is the cumulative message of the decision, which is captured in President Schwe bel's declaration. Although he was "not persuaded that Hungary's position as the Party initially in breach deprived it of a right to terminate the Treaty in response to Czechoslovakia's material breach," the President joined the majority in imposing the resuscitated agreement on the parties. [Vol. 98:167 interpretation that stultified its aim and prevented an international conflict. Of course, Congress can overcome this hurdle by stating ex plicitly its breach of a treaty obligation. But only in extreme casesnot even in the PLO case -would Congress issue such an admission.
Case Concerning the
The combined outcome of these rules insulates many governments from domestic challenges that would require them to renege on treaty obligations against their will. The smaller groups are assured that their gains will last, in one form or another, until the larger groups within all relevant states simultaneously agree to modify their treaty obligations. They also know, as we shall see in the next section, that when it is in their interests to commit an international breach, their government will not be effectively constrained from doing so. In other words, the norms pave a one-way street: governments can hardly be forced to renege on treaty obligations, but when they choose, they can hardly be prevented from doing so. This is exactly what small groups that invest in controlling the governments want.
C. Providing Escape Clauses for Unilateral Defections
Most international treaties are "relational," in that they create re lations between parties that extend well into the future.107 During the life of such treaties, conditions often change, and therefore state nego tiators take pains to ensure that treaty obligations provide efficient mechanisms for adjusting to these changes. Governments prefer to retain control over their reaction to such changes instead of conferring authority on international institutions to determine what adjustments are necessary. Governments ensure their discretion through ambigu ous texts, insufficient monitoring tools, or suboptimal enforcement mechanisms. The small domestic groups warrant this discretion as their interests may be affected by strict future compliance with treaty obligations. Thus, as George Downs and David Rocke have ex plained, international trade law includes weak enforcement norms to accommodate the uncertain future demands of domestic interest groups.108 Parties design enforcement norms strong enough to encour age signatories to observe the agreement most of the time, thereby preventing, for example, trade wars, "but low enough to allow politi cians to break the agreement when interest group benefits are 107. On the characteristics of "relational contracts," see IAN R MACNEIL, THE NEW great."109 Retaliatory measures will often fail to target only the group responsible for the breach and therefore externalize the costs of breach onto other domestic groups.U0
Note that escape clauses that offer impunity for the defecting gov ernment may not be equally available to a legislature that wishes to renege on the treaty. First, the relevant escape clauses are more likely to reflect small group interests. Justifications of the larger groups for breach, such as the interest in sound environmental policies or work ers' conditions, are less likely to permit defection with impunity. Sec ond, the legislature is less capable than the government of monitoring other states' violations, a key tool -if only rhetorical -for justifying one's own breach to both the international community and interna tional tribunals. Lastly, because breaches are followed immediately by international negotiations and possibly adjudication, the government is more capable than the legislature in finessing the consequences of breach (or externalizing the costs onto the larger public). Due to the relative edge enjoyed by the government over the legislature, the for mer is more likely to initiate unilateral defections from international obligations, whereas the latter will likely remain inactive.
Interested small domestic groups also prefer not to seek the courts' protection against their government's decision to renege on its treaty obligations; their political leverage provides sufficient guarantees against the need to do so. In fact, they are more interested in seeing that domestic courts remain uninvolved and refrain from demanding compliance of a reneging government; and courts live up to the expec tation. National courts have faced numerous petitions for injunction challenging domestic policies -whether statutes or administrative decisions -on the grounds that they were incompatible with general international lawm or specific treaty obligations.112 Parties have like wise brought suits challenging the domestic recognition of foreign (Vol. 98:167 governments' acts, such as the expropriation of private property abroad, which international law regarded as illegal.113 National courts have generally reacted negatively to such claims, as judges have in variably chosen to defer to the executive.114 Courts in virtually all de mocracies have shown great ingenuity by inventing an arsenal of "avoidance doctrines" that enable them to align their judgments along governmentally perceived national interests.115 They sidestep ques tioning the international legality of the executive's activities and the fruits of its negotiations.116 In some jurisdictions, notably that of the U.S., courts allow the executive lawfully to violate international cus tomary law.117 It is also widely accepted that the executive may termi nate treaties unilaterally without parliamentary or judicial review.118
Paradoxically, some have attributed the prevalent deferential atti tude to the lack of democratic legitimacy inherent in international treaties and other norms.119 Because the formulation of international treaties and custom is itself democratically deficient, courts do not 113. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) 116. Thus, in the Rhine Pollution case discussed above, see French Pollution Permit Case, supra note 53, at 298, the French Conseil d' E tat upheld the permission to pollute as lawful, finding that international norms (including applicable treaties) did not proscribe it.
For criticism of the decision, see Alexandre Kiss, 2-3 REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, 307-09 (1986) (commentary following the case). Garcia-Mirv. Meese, 788 F2d 1446 , 1454 -55 (11th Cir. 1986 ) (holding that cabinet officers, in addition to the President, may violate international customary law); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 REV. , 1568 REV. -69 (1984 ; Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986) .
See
118. On the U.S. law, see REsTATEMENT, supra note 86, § 339(b) ("Under the law of the United States, the President has the power ... to make the determination that would justify the United States in terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation by another party or because of supervening events, and to proceed to terminate or suspend the agreement on behalf of the United States."). On German law, see Frowein & Hahn, su pra note 91, at 363 (stating that treaty termination power is considered to be within the ex clusive domain of the executive). In those countries that do not require parliamentary ap proval of treaty, executive termination power is obvious. view international obligations as an integral part of the law and hence outside the proper scope of judicial scrutiny. This explanation, how ever, proves too much. It only highlights the undemocratic conse quences of the courts' hesitation: international treaties, which often entail significant domestic ramifications, bypass the courts' muster be cause they also bypassed regular legislative procedures. Executive power remains supreme.
The courts' deference is not, however, motivated by a concern for democratic legitimacy. Instead, it stems from the same global interju risdictional competition that affects the other branches of government. An assertive court that is ready and willing to enforce international norms upon recalcitrant governments (which, for example, refrain from imposing environmental standards on polluting industries) en hances the sanctions for dodging international obligations and in creases their cost.120 Potentially affected firms may therefore decide to relocate to another jurisdiction in which courts are more compliant. For the same reason, national courts have little incentive to impinge upon the laissez-faire underpinnings of international law or to develop stringent standards governing the activity of locally based companies that operate abroad. A judicial assertion, for example, that state par ties to a bankrupt international organization are responsible for its outstanding obligations to third parties, might lead other international organizations to establish headquarters in jurisdictions where such re sponsibility is not recognized.121 Enforcing strict domestic standards on domestic actors operating abroad, such as Union Carbide122 or Texaco,123 may prompt them and others to leave the jurisdiction and set up shop near their competitors. National courts, as much as na tional legislatures and governments, appreciate this threat and join the 120. For a discussion on the importance of escape mechanisms for domestic interest groups, see infra Part IV.
The ITC Litigation, supra note 48 (refusing to recognize the responsibility of state parties for the debts of the international organization). , 1984 , 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986 ), modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1986 ). Despite the Indian government's assertion that Indian courts were un able to cope with the magnitude of this claim, the court opined that litigating in India would better respect Indian sovereignty and judicial self-sufficiency. See id. at 867. The real un derlying issue was, of course, the possibility of obtaining the higher U.S. standards of dam ages including punitive damages.
Gasses released from a pesticide plant owned by Union
123. Two class action suits filed in U.S. courts by Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens against Texaco alleged that Texaco had severely polluted rainforests and rivers in Ecuador and Peru as a result of its oil exploitation activities in Ecuador. The suits were again dis missed for forum non conveniens and reasons of international comity. See Aquinda v. Tex aco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996 ), vacated, 157 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 1998 ); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994). [Vol. 98:167 race to the bottom. They behave like any other actor in a prisoner's dilemma scenario as they pursue one dominant strategy: protect do mestic interests. Only when international guarantees, such as Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, provide judges with assurances that all of their foreign colleagues will cooperate, can this timidity be over come.124 Until such guarantees are assured, potential domestic defec tors can rely on a compliant national court.
This thesis also extends to courts of regional organizations, such as the European Court of Justice (the judicial organ of the European Union), where one would expect a similar partisan attitude when dealing with the external relationships of the organization. And in deed, the European Court of Justice has dismissed a number of chal lenges to the European Commission's and Council's discriminatory policies regarding the "B anana War" involving the E.U., Central American countries, and the United States. 125 The three characteristics of treaties discussed in this Part -small group domination of the negotiation and ratification of treaties, the lack of opportunities for the larger public to challenge existing treaty obligations, and the opportunities for governments and small groups to evade specific clauses with relative impunity -combine to ensure small groups a significant edge over other domestic groups in securing their sectarian interests. The next Part examines the consequences of this predicament. . 423, 426 (1994) . Article 177 ensures that the in terpretation and implementation of Community law by national courts will not diverge from the policies adopted by the central judicial body, the European Court of Justice. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1997, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 76-79. . 321, 338-43 (1997) . But see Case C-122/95, Germany and Belg. v. Council of the E.U., 1998 E.C.R. 1-973, in which the court annulled part of the Council's decision approving the conclusion of a trade agreement with third states because it discriminates between different exporters of bananas to the E.U. Note, however, that at the time of judgment, the relevant agreement was under challenge at the WTO. See WTO Ap pellate Reports, supra note 61 (WfO Appellate Body's decision in the banana dispute). three different global challenges: efficiency, democracy, and social welfare.
IV. DOMESTIC INTEREST GROUPS AND GLOBAL MARKET FAILURES
The efficiency challenge tests the traditional role of the state in providing essential resources to its population and managing the coun try's natural resources efficiently and sustainably. It is becoming in creasingly difficult for states to succeed in these tasks without enlisting long-term commitments to cooperate from other states. When key domestic actors -bureaucrats, politicians, and the business sectorpursue interests at odds with the long-term interests of the general constituency, it decreases both the possibility of effective international cooperation and the prospects for ample provision and optimal alloca tion of resources. The democracy challenge addresses the inadequacy of existing domestic and international processes to give voice to vot ers' preferences and safeguard their interests. Finally, the social wel fare challenge addresses the threat to the ideal of the welfare state posed by a global system that promotes a race to the bottom.
A. The Efficiency Challenge: Tragedies of the Global Commons
This Section argues that in a true Westphalian world of 200-some actors, many collective action problems would have been resolved endogenously. That these problems persist suggests not only that the Westphalian vision is flawed, but that transnational conflicts of inter est are themselves responsible.
Let us assume a world of 200 or so actors, as the Westphalian model wants us to imagine. In this world, states act upon their "na tional interest," which the negotiators internalize. This world must address numerous collective action failures, such as the failure to in crease labor standards, the failure to protect against global warming, or the failure to prevent ozone depletion. In this world, a significant number of these failures will remain unresolved, but many other problems -those involving fewer states -would find a satisfactory solution in the form of spontaneous interaction among the relevant ac tors.
Unitary state actors would still find it diffi cult to overcome situa tions where a relatively large number of states, or all of them, are in volved and in which many have conflicting incentives.126 Global warming, for example, creates divergent incentives for different states because some of them actually stand to gain from the expected warming and moistening of their region, while others will suffer a dis proportionate loss due to desertification. Their diverging incentives 126. Conflicting incentives can be expected to exist between developed and developing countries with respect to the desirability of, for example, antitrust laws and high labor stan dards. See Guzman, supra note 2 (antitrust); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 996-97 (1995) (labor). [Vol. 98:167 may preclude an endogenous provision of the public good in the inter national sphere.127
But the Westphalian world would have resolved quite successfully another type of collective action problem: the regulation of interna tional common pool resources (ICPRs ), which are shared by only a small number of states but from which other states can be excluded.128 Rivers, lakes, transboundary oil fields, and specific fish stocks or migra tory birds, are all examples of ICPRs. With ICPRs, the shared interest in ensuring long-term enj oyment of the resource, combined with the pos sibility of excluding outsiders from access to it, provide adequate incen tive for the limited number of insiders to coordinate their activities and thereby avert a tragedy of their commons.129 Recent game-theoretic models and sociological studies have shown that, under similar condi tions involving groups of individuals, long-term endogenous coopera tion can, and will, emerge without reliance on external enforcement mechanismsY0 In a world of states as unitary players, states' coopera tion in ICPR management should be no less successful than cooperation among individuals in local commons, providing for an optimal and sus tainable use of the resource in question. Even when states have different priorities and capacities, one could expect Coasean deals in which a well off neighbor buys the less wealthy neighb or's cooperation.131 129. The number of riparians may influence the tendency to cooperate. When there are more riparians, coordination is more difficult to attain. The costs of coordinating actors' activi ties and monitoring actors' performance are likely to increase as more formal methods for coor dination and monitoring are required. See HARDIN, supra note 128, at 182-85; SANDLER, supra note 128, at 48; TAYLOR, supra note 128, at 105; EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OFNORMS 47 (1977) .
130. Game-theoretic models suggest that such collective action can emerge wi thout an external enforcement agency through conditional cooperation based on the actors' choice of a friendly "tit-for-tat" strategy.
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) . These models are supported by impressive and convincing evidence on the emergence of collective action among numerous individual actors, mostly in indigenous communities, that has been accumulated and analyzed in recent years. See OSTROM, supra note 128, chs. 3-4; Robert Wade, The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 95 (1987) . For collective action in agriculture and wa ter management, see By al Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 385-87 (1996) , and Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993) . See also WILLIAM M ADAMS, w ASTING TIIE RAIN 42-50, 70-99 (1992) (discussing dry land agriculture and indigenous irrigation in Africa).
131.
Compare the decision of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs suggesting that it would be prepared to engage in a dialogue with "tax havens [that] have chosen to be heavily dependent on their tax industries" and to take account of the "need to encourage the long term development of these economies." OECD, supra note 66, para. 16, at 10-11.
So why in our real world, dominated by transnational conflicts of interest, does ICPR cooperation fail miserably? The main reason lies in the heterogeneous character of the state. For collective action to sustain itself, the involved actors must share an interest in an indefi nite reiteration of their cooperative moves. This occurs only when they place sufficiently high value on their indefinite future gainsthey must have a sufficiently large "shadow of the future. "132 Herein lies the major obstacle to cooperation among states, which are hetero geneous rather than unitary actors. While the general population within each state has a keen interest in long-term cooperation to en sure long-term resource availability and intergenerational equity, other domestic actors, namely bureaucrats, politicians, and the busi ness sector, tend to discount the long-term national benefits of coop eration :while preferring short-term, partisan gains. Bureaucrats my opically focus on their personal conditions and the budgets they manage during their careers in office.133 Politicians (unless organized in closely knit political parties with long-term interests in survival) usually have an even shorter perspective, which extends little further than the coming elections. Finally, the private sector, which can rather cheaply relocate its activities and investments, has very little interest in the future of specific ICPRs (unless the ICPRs are unique, as in the case of sturgeon fish in the Caspian sea, and the company in question has not diversified its activities). This is especially true with respect to developing countries, whose long-term welfare is of little consequence to the typical foreign investor. Environmental tragedies, such as the major recent dumping of oils into the rivers of Ecuador and Peru,134 which irrevocably affect the lives of indigenous peoples, occur because the multinational corporation that is directly responsible, and the local politicians and bureaucrats who are indirectly responsible, act ration ally. The multinational company has a long-term interest in its in vestments, not in the future of a particular ICPR. Domestic politicians and bureaucrats pursue their own short-term goals. Their long-term externalities are born by the general population (including, of course, future generations) , and particularly by the underrepresented indige nous peoples that live in the affected region.
The transnational conflict paradigm therefore provides an impor tant insight into the causes of particular global collective action fail ures. When ICPRs are involved, diverging long-term perspectives within states, not conflicts among states, are responsible for many tragic outcomes.
132. AXELROD, supra note 130, at 126 (suggesting that indefinite reiteration is the key to adopting cooperative strategies among actors in a prisoners' dilemma situation).
133. For a discussion of the different motivations of bureaucrats, see supra notes 18 and 22.
134. See supra note 123 (discussing the class actions against Texaco).
[Vol. 98:167 B. The Democratic Challenge: Ratification as a Democratically
Deficient Process
Public choice literature is replete with analyses of the failure of democratic systems to reflect the actual preferences of the individual voter. The transnational conflict paradigm complements these analy ses by showing an even greater decline in voter power as a result of small-group domination of international politics and an increasingly interdependent world economy .
Smaller interest groups enj oy a disproportionate influence over the state's external policies through their involvement in the process of treaty negotiation and ratification. This process permits very little public scrutiny of the negotiators' acts and omissions because ratifica tion does not allow for amendments; thus many alternatives necessar ily remain unexplored.135 Even the domestic debate on ratification of ten remains clouded because the access of the public and legislators to information concerning international negotiations is invariably lim ited. Little is known about the options offered and discussed, as nego tiators have little incentive to provide accurate information on their performance to the general public.136 Deficient public scrutiny of trea ties, as well as the lack of judicial enthusiasm to scrutinize them,137 se verely handicaps democratic safeguards for ensuring the executive in ternalization of voter preferences.
There exist no institutional oversight mechanisms to protect less successful domestic interest groups, or the interests of future generations. 138 The globalization of markets in the last two decades has further marginalized the voice of the voters. Due to the lower costs of relo cating investments and activities, producers, investors, and employers have fewer commitments to specific jurisdictions. They can therefore fully exploit the global prisoner's dilemma game. As a result of their growing exit options, the voice of larger domestic groups, such as labor unions13 9 and environmentalists,140 has declined considerably. Another aspect of modem development further exacerbates the democratic market failure. With the growing capacity to appropriate and use resources which traverse national boundaries, many decisions are no longer within the sole control of national institutions. A single nation cannot usually unilaterally implement its policies with respect to the use of a river which is shared with other riparians, or with re spect to the regulation of mineral extraction from a shared mine. In stead, regional cooperation, even joint decisionmaking, is required to prevent an imminent race to the bottom. The more cooperation is re quired, the less autonomy national institutions and their constituencies have in making their decisions.141 C. The Social Welfare Challenge: The Threatened Welfare State
The global prisoner's dilemma, presented by the relatively costless relocation of businesses across the globe, pressures national legisla tures to reduce standards for the protection of consumers, employees, and the environment. Lower taxation on capital and caps on public spending (as a result of the openness of monetary markets) require governments to limit their budgets, which in many cases means less public spending on social welfare. 142 The race to the bottom precludes collective action measures that would promote better labor stan dards, 143 protect consumers144 and the environment, and allocate shared resources in an optimal and sustainable way.145 Local and mul tinational firms exploit these failures and externalize a substantial part of their costs on both their fellow citizens and foreign communities. This outcome can be explained by reference to the transnational con flict paradigm. Under the Westphalian paradigm, with state actors pursuing the national interest in promoting welfare, collective action would have stood a better chance of succeeding. The transnational conflict paradigm shows that global market fail ures are often the result of transnational conflict among interest groups rather than international conflict among unitary states. The Westphalian system ignores this reality, and helps perpetuate inter group externalization of costs, and as a result, inefficient, nonsustain able, and inequitable outcomes. Moreover, it does disservice to the idea of democratic governance.
This Part offers new tools to accommodate those conflicts better characterized by the transnational conflict paradigm. It calls for a new understanding of the opportunities provided by regional and interna tional institutions to serve as instruments for managing transnational conflicts. Transnational institutions can serve to reduce small-group capture and provide for equitable and sustainable collective action. Opportunities for public participation in the decisionmaking processes within these institutions will offer effective voice for the public and new meaning for democratic participation in the management of global commons.
A. Transnational Institutions: A Definition
A more structured and transparent treaty negotiation and deci sionmaking process can significantly limit the opportunities of domes tic interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians to pursue short-term sectarian goals to the detriment of the larger society and future gen erations. It is my claim that transnational institutions would be capa ble of responding to a great number of global collective action prob lems in ways that not only promote efficiency, but democracy and social justice as well. With these purposes in mind, and for reasons to be explained below, I define transnational institutions as treaty-based decisionmaking procedures for the coordination of policies with re spect to a specific activity (such as trade, taxation, or antitrust) or a specific shared resource. Such institutions would include, at the very least, permanent bodies and permanent processes for the collection of relevant data, its assessment and dissemination to the public, and the formulation of publicly stated and reasoned policies (in the forms of opinions, recommendations, or decisions) on the basis of that data. As part of their data processing, such institutions should employ mecha nisms for monitoring compliance of the various domestic actors with the institution's policies, also by providing access and soliciting input from NGOs representing a variety of interest groups. Such mecha nisms will reduce informational asymmetries and allow a more mean-ingful role for representatives of the larger domestic interest groups, such as consumers, employees, and environmentalists. In short, trans national institutions would mirror the better types of contemporary, domestic administrative agencies on the global level, while preserving and respecting the still-cherished principle of state sovereignty.
Transnational institutions would not replace governments or domes tic administrative agencies. Their decisionmaking process will function in tandem with parallel domestic processes and guarantee regard to (all) national interests. The definition of transnational institutions is stricter than that of in ternational institutions used by international relations theorists: this definition highlights the specific characteristics of the decisionmaking process as a tool for reducing interest-group capture.147 As explained in the next sections, these characteristics provide an environment for the evolution of conditional cooperation that can resolve collective action problems and respond to the democracy and social justice challenges of this age of globalization. Critics might question the utility of transnational institutions by sug gesting that such institutions, being composed of decisionmakers from all participating states, merely reproduce the problems inherent in typical negotiating scenarios between state negotiators.148 What meaningful role, then, would institutions play? Those following the Westphalian paradigm of unitary state actors, which ignores the problems of small interest-group capture, have viewed institutions -with their independ ent bureaucracy, scientific personnel, or courts -as a means to reduce information asymmetries and other transaction costs among member states, thereby facilitating more efficient negotiations and enforcement mechanisms.149 But institutions matter because they operate in a politi cal environment more aptly described by the transnational conflict para digm. Institutions, as defined earlier, transform a largely unstructured and veiled negotiation process, followed by an insufficiently informed ratification process where the deal is presented as a "take it or leave it" option, into a well defined, widely accessible, and transparent decision making procedure.150 They reduce small-interest capture by allowing wide representation and providing scrutiny of the negotiation process throughout its elaboration.
Channeling deliberations through the transnational institution changes the opportunities and relative control that different actorsrepresentative of various domestic interests, politicians, and bureaucrats -have in the decisionmaking process.151 The structured institutional decisionmaking process counterbalances the relative edge smaller do mestic groups have in obtaining information and exerting leverage dur ing the negotiation and ratification process. 152 J. INT'LECON. L. 123 (1998) .
152.
On the impact of asymmetric information, see supra note 11 and accompanying informational asymmetries by disseminating data collected and assessed within the institution. It further enhances public participation by in volving representatives of the larger domestic groups in the decision making process, allowing them to comment on suggested policies and of fer alternative plans.153 Eliminating the subsequent ratification would reduce the potential of smaller groups to concentrate their capture ef forts in the national institutions. Instead of ratification, public scrutiny of the institution's decision will focus on its stated reasons for its decisions.
Transnational institutions, in contrast to negotiators and more akin to administrative agencies or even courts, would be required to state rea sons for their actions.
An institutionalized process will do more than merely alter the rela tive leverage of conflicting groups. The personal composition of its em ployees and officials can, if properly attended, also contribute signifi cantly to an environment that permits less capture.
Because the structured decisionmaking process should rely on the accumulation and assessment of data, decisions would involve less-politicized personnel. Scientists would process the data, thereby providing common ground that politicians could not avoid in their deliberations.154 These institu tions would have their own bureaucracy who would in tum identify the institution's success and reputation with their own. As transnational butext.
153. The preamble to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters adopted in Aarhus, Den mark on June 25, 1998 by member states of the Economic Commission for Europe and other European states, emphasizes these points:
Recognizing that, in the field of the environment, improved access to information and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns, reaucrats inevitably try to extend their powers, they will naturally push toward more intensified cooperation. 155 The information disseminated to the general public will constrain the range of options open to the poli ticians on the board, and operate as check on their choices.156
These mechanisms will provide a voice for all affected interest groups. As the literature on the emergence of cooperation in the man agement of common property resources suggests, institutions that pro vide for equal voice are more likely to resolve the collective action problems they face.157 In addition to voice, such institutions will be able to hold domestic officials accountable for their acts or omissions by drawing the domestic public's attention to ineffective domestic regula tion of private activities.
These institutions would not need independent enforcement powers. Given the transnational nature of the conflicts, enforcement could re main the private initiative of nonstate participants acting within the do mestic polity and using domestic forums. Well-informed NGOs could, for example, respond to free-riding attempts by other substate actors (and the governments' compliance with such attempts) by staging do mestic public opinion campaigns, thereby exerting effective political pressure on incumbent governments and members of the legislature. They could also, although probably with less success,158 petition domestic courts for judicial review. In short, NGOs would be able to act equally as effectively as they do in response to entirely domestic policies.
The U.S.-Canada International Joint Commission, entrusted with management of the rivers shared by the two states, is an example of effective regional collective action.159 In only four of the 110 applica-155. In its recent proposal, "The IJC and the 21st century," the U.S.-Canada IJC sug gested establishing permanent IJC international watershed boards to manage additional major transboundary basins. See !J C to Further Examine Watershed Approach (press re lease, Nov. 23, 1998) tions for decisions before 1987 were there any dissenting opinions by Commission members, and in only two of them did the dissent follow national lines. Both governments adopted more than three-quarters of the Commission's decisions.160 Another example is the Finnish Swedish Frontier Rivers Commission established in 1977, whose deci sions have always been unanimously accepted, despite the fact that only a maj ority vote is necessary.161 In both cases, information and voice have been sufficient substitutes for independent enforcement measures.
The International Labour Organisation is an example of a global organization whose effectiveness is enhanced by wide participation.
Deliberations follow the concept of "tripartism": each state's delega tion to all of the deliberative bodies is comprised of two government representatives, one representative for each the employers and the workers.162 The latter are instrumental in negotiating the standards and implementing them within the national jurisdictions.163
This is not to suggest that transnational institutions would be free of challengers to their authority. In states where small groups enj oy relatively high political leverage, one could expect less commitment to compliance. Deep-seated animosity among rival communities might also overshadow rational considerations and hinder cooperation. But as collective action failures grow more dramatic and individuals more fully grasp their repercussions, popular demand for effective transna tional institutions will eventually produce them.
C. Institutions and Democracy
The structured decisionmaking process in transnational institutions also responds to the democratic challenge, providing three essential democratic tools. First, and perhaps most important, the improved in formation institutions provide to voters counterbalances their inherent deficiency in monitoring the domestic institutions' performance. It exposes both domestic policies and international engagements of the government to voter scrutiny. By informing the voters on their gov- Second, open access to the institutions' procedures gives domestic populations an opportunity to influence regional and global policies that affect their interests: it provides a voice without a vote. A cynic might criticize such an imperfect voice as politically meaningless, and indeed it could be. But when strong cross-cultural links exist between communities, voices will matter even when no vote supports them . 164 The German Constitutional Court expressed a strong belief in the ef fectiveness of such a voice in approving Germany's ratification of the Maastricht Treaty:
If democracy is not to remain a formal principle of accountability, it is dependent upon the existence of specific privileged conditions, such as ongoing free interaction of social forces, interests, and ideas, in the course of which political objectives are also clarified and modified, and as a result of which public opinion moulds political policy. For this to be achieved, it is essential that both the decisionmaking process amongst those institutions which implement sovereign power and the political objectives in each case should be clear and comprehensible to all, and also that the enfranchised citizen should be able to use its own language in communicating with the sovereign power to which it is subject. 165 This statement may reflect only the Court's assessment of the political environment in the European Union; but it might also represent an emerging trend to take seriously the deliberative process that precedes the actual taking of votes. According to the argument, the process of reasoning and persuasion that precedes the actual vote is effective in eliminating Pareto-inferior outcomes and providing for more equita ble distribution of resources. Such a deliberative process would le gitimize the decision taken and thus ensure greater compliance. 166 At the very least, the requirement that transnational institutions offer reasons for their decisions will increase the accountability of deci sionmakers, just as the reasoning of court opinions serves as a con straint on judicial power. 167 The third democratic tool consists of removing specific matters from interest groups' influence. Venerable democratic institutions such as the courts and central banks are designed to be independent from the immediate influences of the voters and political pressures. To the extent that such insulation from politics is legitimate, transna tional institutions can make it happen. Thus, for example, the recent European monetary integration, which entailed a complete loss of sovereign control over monetary policies, is compatible with democ racy. In approving the transfer of power to the new institution, the German Constitutional Court accepted the government's "scientifi cally proven" argument that such a move was necessary to "ensure that the currency is not vulnerable to pressure groups or to holders of political office seeking re-election . "168 Institutions that collect and as sess information concerning, for example, the shared environment or other ICPRs, inform, but also constrain, the choices open to politi cians. Any sound democratic theory must recognize the crucial role of scientific input to political decisionmaking .16 9 the scope of this Article to enter into the debate about the merits of this theory. For critical views, see, for example, David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Ta lk in Political Decision Making, 16(1) INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 45 (1992); James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Cri tique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Ta lk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996) . Suffice it to say that those who subscribe to the theory would find in transnational institutions a fo rum for deliberation.
167. This constraint is particularly potent when judges consider overruling prior deci sions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) ("The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's le gitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.").
168. Maastricht Tr eaty Case, supra note 165, at 439. The German Federal Constitutional Court reasoned:
This modification of the principle of democracy, which is designed to secure the confidence of making payment that is placed in a curr ency, is justifiable, because it takes account of the special factor, established in the German system and also scientifically proven, that an inde pendent central bank is more likely to protect monetary value, and therefore the general economic basis for national budget policy and private planning and disposition, while main taining economic liberty than are sovereign governmental institutions.
Id. at 439-40. mal recognition of their role and importance has so far been given only in nonbinding declarations.175
Of course, the establishment of transnational institutions presents a collective action problem, which could itself entail attempts to insti tutionalize opportunistic gains.176 As soon as the larger domestic groups across political boundaries realize the stakes involved, pres sures to reform the law and create responsive institutions should be expected.177 The process of designing transnational institutions must itself include the participation of the wider public, both through repre sentative NGOs and the dissemination of accessible information -it will not be an easy task. A delicate balance must be struck between , governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental representa tion, thereby ensuring that narrow interests, including those advanced by NGOs, cannot predominate.178 175. The 1992 Rio Declaration notes that "[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level." Declaration of the UN Con ference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, Principle 10. Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 calls for active public participation in shared freshwater manage ment, which includes not only the provision of a right of hearing to oppose plans that could be detrimental to certain individuals or groups, but more generally, requires states to aim at "an approach of full public participation, including that of women, youth, indigenous people and local communities in water management policy-making and decision-making," Agenda , 1995) . Although the New York Convention mentions neither of these ideas and maintains the stiff separation between the international and the domestic levels by providing only for state-to-state notification and consultation, there are scholars who find it possible to derive such participatory rights from more basic notions of civil and political rights, see 177. One radical response to these challenges is the establishment of a "cosmopolitan democracy," based on an international constitution which provides for separation of differ ent institutional powers and individual rights. See HELD, supra note 141, at 267-83.
[Vol. 98:167
VI. CONCLUSION
Lowering costs of relocating investments and activities, combined with declining East-West political pressures, have spawned transna tional economic activity in which investors and employers are no longer committed to a specific territory or community. The rise of multinational corporations and the globalization of the world econ omy have increased the interdependency of national markets; new technologies have increased the potential for unilateral appropriation of global commons, and thus raised the stakes involved in influencing governmental decisionmaking. As a result, smaller domestic groups are uniquely positioned to exploit the resulting global prisoner's di lemma; as a result, the relative political power of larger domestic in terest groups continues to decline.
Contemporary voters face a process of ever-growing marginaliza tion. First, they are marginalized by the growing interdependency of global markets, which increases the bargaining position of smaller domestic interest groups. Second, they are marginalized because deci sions regarding resources -water, clean air, fisheries -no longer depend solely on their vote, but to a growing extent on interstate co operation with governments sharing access to those resources. These parallel developments have undermined the principles behind the democratic state; the right to participate in elections and influence de cisionmakers, although increasingly gaining recognition across the globe, in fact provides right-holders much less than it purports to promise. These and future generations of voters must bear economic externalities their governments do not care or are unable to prevent. The transnational conflict paradigm identifies the domestic mecha nisms that shape national attitudes towards transnational cooperation and demonstrates the crucial role of transnational institutions in coor dinating national policies. It also explains why relatively few effective institutions have been established thus far.
The laissez-faire environment of the globalization process cannot remain unchallenged. Although larger groups within society find it more cumbersome to join forces, they ultimately succeed. The rise of the welfare state is a clear example. Following Olson's logic, 178 the in ternational community can anticipate larger interest groups -con sumers, employees, and environmentalists -to grow more assertive in world politics and create pressure to imp ose global restrictions on trade and resource management.179 It is thus necessary to design ap-178. See OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 9; OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 15. 179. See, e.g., HELD, supra note 141 (calling for "cosmopolitan democracy"); McGinnis, supra note 27 (discussing the possible emergence of internationally centralized regulatory control of international trade).
propriate procedures and institutions -not to replace the state sys tem, but to complement and respond to its deficiencies. Designing structures for a more involved global constituency must be done with the utmost care; the progression from city-states to nations to a global community has reached its limit. As opposed to previous attempts to design political institutions, new global institutions will leave few exit options.180
180. See McGinni s, supra note 27, at 924.
